Becker, Gary S. and Stigler, George J. () “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies: Vol. 3: No. 1, Article . Loading data.. Open Bottom Panel. Go to previous Content Download this Content Share this Content Add This Content to Favorites Go to next Content. ← →. Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,” The Journal of Legal Studies 3, no. 1 (Jan., ): 1
|Published (Last):||15 February 2017|
|PDF File Size:||13.20 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||1.58 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Help us Corrections Found an error or omission? THE new economic approach to political behavior seeks to develop a positive theory of legislation, in contrast to the normative approach of welfare economics.
General contact details of provider: Ref 11 Source Add To Collection. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the “citations” tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Other Papers By First Author. Download full text from publisher File URL: Ref 21 Source Add To Collection. Ref Source Add To Collection.
It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about. Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription. Ref 30 Source Add To Collection. As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers.
Ivar Kolstad 4 Estimated H-index: If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. You can help adding them by using this form. Ref 31 Source Add To Collection. Breno Emerenciano Albuquerque 1 Estimated H-index: You can help correct errors and omissions.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Crime, Punishment, and Institutions. David Mark Wilson Clemson University.
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
We have no references for this item. Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. Becker Enforcees of ChicagoCasey B. Mulligan University of Chicago.
Transparency in oil rich economies. Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services. RePEc uses comensation data supplied nad the respective publishers.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item’s handle: If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers.
The new approach asks why certain industries and not others become regulated or have tariffs imposed on imports or why income transfers take the form and direction they do, in contrast to asking which industries should be regulated or have tariffs imposed, or what transfers should be made.
See general information about how enforcemeht correct material in RePEc. Incomplete Contracts and Endogenous Enforcement.