Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature, conditions, and extent of human knowledge. It asks questions like: “What. CAN EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE HAVE A FOUNDATION. advertisement A FOUNDATION? Laurence Bonjour Again, what is the doctrine of the given???. Reading Bonjour, and this essay is a little wordy. Anyone care to summarize?.

Author: Kajikasa Mukinos
Country: United Arab Emirates
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Photos
Published (Last): 14 December 2012
Pages: 354
PDF File Size: 19.98 Mb
ePub File Size: 16.78 Mb
ISBN: 353-4-28537-591-7
Downloads: 89669
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Akizilkree

Both of these approaches have in fact been attempted.

Indeed, it is not necessary that anyone know or justifiably believe those premises. Bruce Aune – – Grazer Philosophische Studien 7: Historical foundationalist positions typically make stronger and more ambitious claims on behalf of their chosen class of basic beliefs. This second sort of reliability is crucial; on it depends, in large part at least, the possibility of negative observational knowledge.

Thus an adequate consideration of foundationalism need concern itself with nothing stronger than moderate foundationalism. Leave a Reply Cancel reply Enter your comment here How would you describe the fundamental confusion that Bonjour thinks foundationalist accounts suffer from??? Chisholm on Empirical Knowledge.

But premise 1 is merely a statement of the basic foundationalist thesis, and premise 2 has, I will assume, been adequately justified in Chapter 1. And thus his acceptance of B is no more rational or responsible from an epistemic standpoint than would be the acceptance of a subjectively similar belief for which the external relation in question failed to obtain. Moreover, weak foundationalism faces at least one serious objection which does not apply to moderate foundationalism, namely that the underlying logic of the weak foundationalist’s account has never been made adequately clear.

But if this intuition or apprehension that justifies a belief is a cognitive state, then it is difficult to see what justifies the intuition or apprehension itself. This entry was posted in Philosophy. The basic gambit of many recent foundationalist positions is to reject premise 3 of the foregoing argument by claiming in effect that although it is indeed necessary in order for a belief to be justified, and a fortiori for it to be basic, that a justifying argument be in a certain sense available in the situation, it is not necessary that the person for whom the belief is basic know, or justifiably believe, or even believe at all, the premises of such an argument.


Now it seems to follow from the logic of the concept of belief that S1 and S2 must be distinct states of affairs. Weak foundationalism is a version of foundationalism because it holds that there are basic beliefs having some degree, though a relatively low one, of noninferential epistemic justification.

Thus we may conclude, at least provisionally, that for any acceptable moderate foundationalist account, at least one of the two premises of the appropriate justifying argument will itself be empirical.

Beliefs having feature f are highly likely to be true. Belief B is an instance of kind K 2. There might of course be other reasons for requiring that basic beliefs have some more exalted epistemic status or for thinking that in fact they do.

Alston – – Synthese 55 April: The common thesis of all versions of empirical foundationalism is that some empirical beliefs have a degree of noninferential epistemic justification, justification that does not derive from other empirical beliefs in a way which would require those beliefs to be antecedently justified. The problem of free will. Hilary Kornblith – – Synthese 74 3: And in fact such a claim seems to be what was intended by most of the historical proponents of foundationalism in employing these terms, even though, for largely accidental reasons, they often couched their claims in these other ways.

Year 8 Assessment — life after death. So, what is your reaction? And while it is much less clear how the other two objections to coherence theories are to be answered, especially the second, the weak foundationalist seems at least to have a good deal more room for maneuver. A proponent of logical infallibility must claim that this is, in the cases he is interested in, not logically possible, but it is hard to see what the basis for such a claim might be, so long as S1 andS2 are conceded to be separate states of affairs.

Belief B has feature f.

Laurence BonJour, Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation? – PhilPapers

Another Foundationalist view that attempts to solve the problem is the doctrine of cognitive givenness, according to which basic beliefs are justified in an immediate or intuitive way by states of affairs rather than further beliefs. So, empitical is the idea so far: That is, I’ll have some other belief that helps in justifying belief B, so B can’t be foundational at all.


What’s Wrong with Immediate Knowledge? The laurenec this brings up is how any of our beliefs can be justified if we need an infinite string of justified beliefs.


Without further amplification, on this last issue especially, it is very hard to assess the view seriously. Then use these results to deal with I and III. Beliefs may of course be about other beliefs, but beliefs cannot somehow be directly about themselves. His argument centers around justification, which he thinks goes something like: Probability and Coherence Justification. Epistemicism and the Liar. Moderate foundationalism, as the label suggests, represents a relatively mild version of foundationalism.

For the weak foundationalist’s basic beliefs are not adequately justified on their own to serve as justifying premises for everything else. Want to add to the discussion? Find it on Scholar. How can coherence, not itself an independent source of justification on a empriical view, justify the rejection of some initially credible beliefs and enhance the justification of others?


The weak foundationalist does appear to have an adequate answer to the first of the standard objections to the coherence theory set forth earlier: Laurencw problem is that 2 itself is an empirical belief and needs to be inferentially justified by further beliefs. Questions about philosophy, e.

Certainty is most naturally interpreted as pertaining to one’s psychological state khowledge conviction, or perhaps to the status of a proposition as logically or metaphysically necessary, with neither of these interpretations having any immediate epistemic import.

This difficulty may be developed a bit by appealing to the account of the general concept of epistemic justification which was presented in Chapter I. Submit a new text post. The central question that Bonjour asks: If are true, then P is likely to be true. OK, so Bonjour’s arguing against the foundationalist view in epistemology. B is non-inferential iff B is not actually arrived at on the basis of inference from other beliefs.