Which of the following is NOT part of an argument for eliminative materialism? a. How does Churchland respond to the objection that introspection reveals the. Eliminative Materialism. Paul Churchland. The identity theory was called into doubt not because the prospects for a materialist account of our mental capacities. Paul M. Churchland; Published Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at.

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To support i and ii Stich relies on two premises: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.

Gradually, these everyday folk psychological explanations were replaced by more efficient scientific descriptions.

They provide a set of roles or conditions that more or less must be met for the instantiation of any given state.

Eliminative materialism – Wikipedia

Mental States and Processes in Philosophy of Mind. Here our focus is the conditional question: Thus, for eliminative materialism to get off the ground, we need to assume that scientific psychology is going to turn out a certain way. The eliminativist needs to argue that the representations that feed into action are fundamentally different from those invoked by propositional attitude psychology.

Modern versions of eliminative materialism claim that our common-sense understanding of psychological states and processes is deeply mistaken and that some or all of our ordinary notions of mental states will have no home, at any level of analysis, in a sophisticated and accurate account of the mind.

The reason mental states are irreducible is not because they are non-physical; rather, it is because mental states, as described by common-sense psychology, do not really exist. Paul Feyerabend in 20th Century Philosophy. Weak ontic commitments involve the types-of-things countenanced by some theory.

So the eliminativist will hold that the self-refutation critics beg the question against eliminative materialism. Churchland, ; Cling, ; Devitt, ; Ramsey, In response, Michael Devitt and Georges Rey argue that Boghossian’s argument, despite its sophistication, nevertheless begs the eliminahive by ascribing to the eliminativist some version of truth-conditional semantics, whereas many eliminativists would reject such a view of linguistic expressions.


A common eliminativist response to this argument is to re-emphasize a lesson from the philosophy of science; namely, that any theory—especially one that is as near and dear to us as folk psychology—can often appear successful even when it completely misrepresents reality. According to the Churchlands, these considerations indicate that folk psychology may be in much worse shape than we commonly recognize P.

Apart from the strong intuitive evidence that seems to reveal beliefs and desires, we also enjoy a great deal of success when we use common sense psychology to predict elminative actions of other people. Some writers have emphasized the apparent mismatch between the sentential structure of propositional attitudes on the one hand, and the actual neurological structures of the brain on the other hand.

The best explanation for the success we enjoy in explaining and predicting human and animal behavior is that folk psychology is roughly true, and that there really are beliefs Kitcher, ; Fodor, ; Lahav, Eliminatiev result of the argument is to reopen the case for idealism and dualism and to force the issue to be determined on other grounds. Some supporters of eliminativism argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desiresince they are poorly defined.

They occur not only in all thinking on behavior but throughout science as well. Philosophers who argue against eliminativism may take several approaches.

Eliminative materialism

On the one hand, there are philosophers who deny that mental states are linguistic in nature and see this as a straw man argument. The paper argues that in this field One way to get a stronger eliminativist conclusion would be to argue that there is nothing posited in a scientific account of cognition that shares the central properties we attribute to folk psychological states, at any chuechland of analysis.


Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of ScienceVol. For example, several projects pursued by philosophers in recent years have attempted to provide a reductive account of the semantic content of propositional attitudes that is entirely naturalistic i. While Sellars himself regarded this theoretical framework as empirically correct, his claim that our conception of the mind is theory-based, and at least in principle falsifiable, would be influential to later supporters of eliminativism.

However, people unfamiliar with philosophy and cognitive science do know all those things. Thus, the relationship between eliminative materialism and science may be more reciprocal than many have assumed. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Second, beliefs resemble public sentences in that they have semantic properties.

German Idealism in European Philosophy. While eliminativists would need to construct some sort of non-truth-conditional semantics, Devitt and Rey argue that the challenge of such a project reveals only that eliminativism is implausible, not that it is, as Boghossian claims, incoherent Devitt, ; Devitt and Rey, Derek Parfit, “Personal Identity”.

Philosophy and The Matrix”. Even among theory-theorists there is considerable disagreement about the plausibility of eliminative materialism. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense; cannot His argument focuses on the apparently essential features of qualia, including their inherent subjectivity and their private nature.

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