Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice [David Galula, David Galula] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Back in print after almost. This monograph describes the nature and dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations citing David Galula’s theory. In his book. WARFARE. Theory and Practice. David Galula. Foreword by John A. Nagl. PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era. Praeger Security International. Westport.
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Having developed a strategic base for counterinsurgency, Galula turns his attention to tactics. Open Preview See a Problem? He wrote the book under the assumption that the West, particularly the United States, will automatically grow heavily involved in future insurgency-based warfare.
But decisive action does not necessarily mean military action. One of Galula’s laws is, “In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause”. There is also much in it to make me think how massive a political failure the Iraq war – and to a good extent, the war in Afghanistan as well – represents.
Check out our Quick Start Guide or Video. Theory and Practice Westport, Connecticut: Mar 20, Teoh rated it it was amazing. Laws and Principals of Counterinsurgency Warfare. With no positive policy but with good propaganda, the insurgent may still win.
The First Area as a Test Area. Lists with This Book.
Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. Thus, according to the laws of counterinsurgency, it is important to continuously make efforts at gaining and maintaining the support of the populace in distinct areas by leveraging an active minority.
First, its not an accurate representation of what the French or the other Western xounterinsurgency actually did in their colonial wars.
A quick and easy read don’t be fooled by how long it took me; I went through part of it for a paper and then decided recently to read through it’s entirety for anyone interested in insurgency warfare. Each author strived to abstract his experience in order to transform the conventional military and the political establishment and to meet the demands of counterinsurgency warfare and to achieve victory.
The Power of Ideology. I have been doing some studying up on warfare and counterinsurgency warfare in particular, and this is one the most basic and essential texts on the subject.
Aug 23, Jared rated it it was amazing. Account Options Sign in. Feb 05, Dan Bell rated it really liked it Shelves: Oct 07, Adam Elkus rated it liked it Shelves: The “Laws” According to Galula, there are four “laws” of counterinsurgency.
From the “father” of COIN doctrine. The United States faces very different enemies today. Having attained the support of the population it is imperative to remember counteirnsurgency this support is conditional.
Tactics Having developed a strategic base for counterinsurgency, Galula turns his attention to tactics. Indeed, a counterinsurgency exists only in reaction to an insurgency.
Links to quality news, opinion pieces, and reports that explain the intractable conflict problem and highlight successful responses. However, he cautions that the lessons of this book do not guarantee success and that, “As long as the revolutionary situation exists, even in a dormant form, as long as the problem that gave rise to the insurgency has not been eliminated, the danger persists” p An essential aspect of this “compass” is the realization that public support for the state should be the primary goal of counterinsurgency and that this makes counterinsurgency operations above all, political operations.
Despite being a rather slim volume consisting of only pages, and reflecting upon a short time-span of counterinsurgency dating from the end of WWII to the early 60s, this is a concisely-written book that can either be scoured in a day or contemplated in a week.
A must read for anyone who wants to understand what the Counterinsurgeency is attempting to do now in Iraq and how the majority of the wars of the counterinsurgnecy will be fought. Revolutionary War Nature and Characteristics. Much of what I have to say are merely reflections of an amateur observer.
Though he was fiercely anti-Communist, his captors treated him well and he eventually was released through the help of the Marshall mission.
Selected pages Title Page. But Galula also got a counrerinsurgency of other stuff right, and he deserves credit for his insights. Strengthening the Political Machine.
Theory and Practice by David Galula”. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerillas. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support counterinsurbency the active leaders. David Galula was a French military officer and scholar who counterinsurbency influential in developing the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare.
I hope American leadership can learn and build upon some of the principles and lessons listed in Galula’s book. It is quite amazing how well this book has aged, it’s concepts are still whole and can easily be merged with other works of political science and sociology to form a powerful ‘lens’ to understand happenings around the world.
Aside from redefining a priori limitations to military engagements, Galula ingeniously prescribes new develop In Counterinsurgency Warfare: Galula lays out the basic steps of an insurgency or couhterinsurgency war and the steps neccessary to combat or suppress one.
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula
The simplicity and common sense approach to this book is what makes it such a worthwhile book to read, but this straightforwardness of the author’s writing belies the actual complexity of counter insurgent work.
They can act directly on the insurgent leaders, they can act indirectly on the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency, they can infiltrate the insurgent movement, or they can reinforce their own “Political Machine”.
It is human nature and people are always busy with their own lives to worry about the rest.
From Strategy to Tactics.